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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Almon Manes passed away on February 10, 2009. R 6. During his last days he relied 
upon Samson to help him with his estate. TR 165 II 23 through 166 II 5. Upon his passing, 
Miller, the personal representative, engaged Samson to supervise the estate. Petitioner's 
Exhibit 1. Shortly after Manes' death or while upon his deathbed, in February of 2009, 
Miller proposed compensating Samson with personalty from the estate. TR 183 11 4-9. 
Samson rejected the February of 2009 offer stating that he would need money. Id. Miller 
responded by saying he would be "well-compensated." TR 1281114-22, & 182 II 17-20. 
Samson did not recollect an hourly rate of pay. TR 182 II 22-25. 
Samson began working for the estate in February of 2009 under an implied contract. 
TR 128 ll 12-22 & 183 ll 4-9. Samson had been working on the Estate for several months, 
when in May of 2009, Miller sent Samson a written proposal for his consideration. See 
Petitioner's Exhibit 7. Samson expressly rejected Miller's May of 2009 proposal, bur 
continued to work for the estate under the terms of the February 2009 implied contract 
TR 1341120 through 135 111-3 & 151114-11. 
Further, Miller wrote to Samson often and on at least two occasions asked him to 
accept cash money in partial payment for his labor. Petitioner's Exhibic 6 & 12. Samson \vas 
terminated in September and in October he sent a written bill to Miller. Petitioner's Exhibit 
8 & 9A. The bill was not paid, his claim thereon disallowed, and the matter was heard by 
~/Iagistrate Jeff Payne who allowed the bulk of the claim. Miller filed a motion to reconsider, 
the motion was heard and denied by Judge Payne. Miller appealed to the District Court and 
the District Court affirmed the Magistrate's decision. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Magistrate court err when it determined that the parties did not have a May 
2009 express contract based upon performance -- or rather -- did the Nagistrate err 
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in determining that negotiations in May of 2009 did not result in a modification of 
the February of 2009 implied-in-fact contract? 
2. Did the Magistrate Court err by finding a February 2009 implied-in-fact contract 
existed between the parties? 
3. Did the Magistrate Court err in granting quantum meruit relief when said theory 
was not argued by Samson? 
4. Did the Magistrate Court err in awarding reasonable value of services damages and 
reasonable expenses damages? 
5. Is Samson entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal? 
SUPREME COURT STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to 
determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to 
support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the 
magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. If those 
findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom 
and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we 
affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. 
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670 (2008). 
DISTRICT COURT'S STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Imposition of an equitable remedy requires a balancing of the 
equities, which is inherently a factual determination; therefore, the 
district court's imposition of such a remedy should be reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. A trial court does not abuse its discretion if 
it (1) correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within 
the bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal standards, 
and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason. Review 
of a trial court's conclusions from a bench trial is limited to 
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ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, 
and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. 
Since it is the province of the trial court to weigh conflicting 
evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses, this Court will liberally construe the trial court's findings 
of fact in favor of the judgment entered. This Court will not set 
aside a trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly 
erroneous. If the trial court based its findings on substantial 
evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, this Court will not 
overturn those findings on appeal. This Court will not substitute its 
view of the facts for that of the trial court. However, this Court 
exercises free review over matters of law. 
justad v. Ward, 14 7 Idaho 509 (2009) (internal citations omitted). 
I. DID THE MAGISTRATE COURT ERR WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THE PARTIES DID 
NOT HAVE A MAY 2009 EXPRESS CONTRACT BASED UPON PERFORMANCE -- OR RATHER 
-- DID THE MAGISTRATE ERR IN DETERMINING THAT NEGOTIATIONS IN MAY OF 2009 
DID NOT RESULT IN A MODIFICATION OF THE FEBRUARY OF 2009 IMPLIED-IN-FACT 
CONTRACT? 
Neither the Idaho Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals considers assignments of 
error not supported by argument and authority in the opening brief. See Ho99 v. Wolske, 
142 Idaho 549, 559 (2006) ( emphasis added). Here, Miller does not cite a single authority 
in support of her argument that an express contract is formed by performance -- or even 
part performance as the facts of this case might lend itself to. See Appellant's Brief at 3-5. 
The only authority that Miller cites in support of her issue is the rule that equity does not 
intervene when an express contract prescribes the right to compensation. See Appellant's 
Brief at 5. Said authority has absolutely nothing to do with the issue of whether or not 
performance forms a contract. Therefore, the issue should be dismissed. 
SHOULD THE FOREGOING ARGUMENT FAIL, THEN IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
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Miller appears to argue that Samson's performance of some of the provisions of 
Miller's May of 2009 written proposal; and-or that statements made by Samson's attorney 
regarding the use of said proposal to examine Samson at trial; operate together to form an 
express contract. However, as stated above, Miller provides no authority on which to 
analyze her contention. 
The Idaho Supreme Court recognizes three types of contractual relationships: (1) an 
express contract wherein the parries exprcss1y agree regarding a transaction: (2) an 
implied-in-fact contract wherein there is no express agreement, but the conduct of the 
parties implies an agreement from ,Nhich an obiigation in contract exists; and (3) an 
irnplied-·in-law contract, or quasi contract. Fox ;1. Mountain West Electric. lnc., 137 Idaho 
703, 707-708 (2002). 
Here, the parties never agreed to Miller's May of 2009 written proposal. TR 134 ll 
20 through 135 ll 1-3, & 151 114-11. Miller's May of 2009 vvritten proposal v,as nev2r 
signed by Samson. Id. & see page 8 of Petitioner's Exhibir: ?, Th<'.~re vvas no testimeny or 
evidence that disputes Samson's testimony or the fact that Samson's signature does not 
appear on Miller's May of 2009 written proposal. Samson expressly rejected the written 
proposal. TR 151 II 4·· 11. Thus, it is indisputable that there was no express contract. 
Formation of an express contract: based upot1 part performance is only applicable as 
an exception to the statut2 of frauds. See Ogden v. Griffith, 149 Idaho 489, 493 (2010). Part 
performance does not substitute for an incomplete agreement, but instead operates to 
allow an agreement to be enforced when it does not comply with the statute of frauds. 
Bauchman-Kingston Partnership, LP v. Haroldsen, 149 Idaho 87, 93 (2008). Equitable 
estoppel generally, and the doctrine of part performance specifically, assume the existence 
of a complete agreement. Chapin v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393, 396 (2007). 
Here, Miller contends that Millers' May of 2009 written proposal, which Samson 
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rejected, should be enforced against Samson because he had performed some of the work 
outlined in said proposal. (See the transcript excerpts immediately following this 
paragraph for Samson's verbal rejection.) However, there was no testimony or evidence 
offered that Samson accepted the proposal, Miller simply argues the point without any 
evidence beyond Samson testifying that he did some of the work that was listed in the 
proposed agreement. Moreover, the evidence adduced at trial was that Samson rejected 
Miller's May of 2009 written proposal by refusing to sign it and by telling Miller that he did 
not like the proposal: 
Clark: Okay. Did you sign this agreement? [referring to Miller's 
May of 2009 written proposa I] 
Samson: No, I did not. 
Clark: Why didn't you sign this agreement? 
Samson: For one thing it was like a dictator telling me how much I 
had to get done, when I can't do it that fast. When you're going 
through trying to save stuff that belongs to Virginia, and I just 
couldn't do it. And she wanted me to throw a lot of it away and 
save all the antiques for her, and I just couldn't do it. 
TR 134 11 20 through 135 11 1-3. 
Clark: Did you ever receive monetary reimbursement for your 
services? 
Samson: Nope. 
Clark: Is that one of the reasons that you didn't agree to this? 
[again referring to Miller's May of 2009 written proposal] 
Samson: Yes. And I disagreed to it, and I told her I did not like the 
way she wrote it up. She said she was going to write another one. 
TR 151114-11. 
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A rejection of an offer to contract cannot be construed in any way, shape, or form as 
a "complete agreement" as the part performance exception rule requires. Furthermore, 
here, there was no statute of frauds defense presented by either party or the Magistrate. 
Nor was there any agreement that would have been an enforceable contract, but for the 
operation of the statute of frauds. Therefore, partial performance doctrine does not apply 
to the present case whatsoever. 
Miller argues a contract was formed in May of 2009 -- an argument that the 
Magistrate considered then specifically and soundly rejected. R 72. There was no need for 
the Magistrate to specifically address "part performance" exception rule to the statute of 
frauds because the statute of frauds was never in play and Miller's May of 2009 written 
proposal was rejected by Samson and so incurable by the part performance exception as a 
matter of law. 
It is true that during the trial, Samson's attorney examined Samson as to the terms of 
Miller's May of 2009 written proposal. Specifically Samson's attorney's inquiries were 
more or less focused on the work Samson had been performing for the estate prior to 
receiving Miller's May of 2009 written proposal. See TR 149 1119 through 150 111-20. 
Miller's attorney objected since Samson was arguing that the contract was not enforceable. 
Id. Samson's attorney simply noted that using Miller's May of 2009 written proposal to 
elicit Samson's testimony was relevant because there may be a question of partial 
performance. Id. Miller's attorney now appears to argue that Samson's attorney's 
comment regarding relevancy somehow estopped the Magistrate from making his finding 
that there was no new implied contract formed in May of 2009. 
The facts of this case are remarkably similar to Treasure Valley. In Treasure Valley, a 
healthcare facility attempted to circumvent the statute of frauds on an employment 
contract that could not be completed in one year. ld. at 487-488. The healthcare facility 
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wanted to enforce a non-compete clause. Id. The healthcare facility presented at least two 
different agreements and the doctor did not sign either one because she wanted some 
revisions. Id. Nevertheless, the doctor began working for the healthcare facility and then 
later, it seems, engaged in activity in contradiction to the proposed non-compete clause. Id. 
The Court of Appeals ultimately held: 
It was within Treasure Valley's power to insist 
upon execution of the contract before Dr. Woods 
began work or thereafter. Having failed to do so, 
Treasure Valley is now prevented by the statute of 
frauds from gaining judicial enforcement of the 
contractual terms that it requesced but did not 
secure. 
Treasure Valley at 492. At all stages of that case, the doctor consistently denied agreeing to 
all of the provisions in the draft contracts presented by the healthcare facility. Treasure 
Valley at 491. Also, she specifically denied agreeing to the covenant not to compete. Id. 
Treasure Valley stands for the proposition that an enforceable contract is not formed by the 
acknowledgment and-or performance of one party to some terms in a proposed contract_ 
where the proposal was rejected and-or. specific provisions of the proposal were rejected. 
In this case, Samson has consistently denied agreeing to Miller's May of 2009 
written proposal in whole, and specifically denied agreeing to work for personalty only. TR 
TR 1341120 through 135111-3 & TR 151114-11. Like Treasure Valley, Samson did not sign 
Miller's May of 2009 written proposal. Id. & Petitioner's Exhibit 7. He did not agree to the 
term of no monetary compensation that Miller now seeks to have the Court impose upon 
him -- in fact -- he insisted on money. TR 183 ll 4-9. In reviewing the breadth of his 
testimony, it seems fair to say that this was one of the terms that Samson most objected to, 
and yet Miller now asserts that the very term rejected should be the imposed term. 
Samson did a lot of the work listed in Miller's May of 2009 written proposal, but he 
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had already begun the work beginning in February of 2009.1 Petitoner's Exhibit 1 & 2, & TR 
157 ll 5 through 168 ll 9. His performance was coupled with the parties February of 2009 
agreement that resulted in an implied contract. Id. Samson did not perform based upon 
the proposed and rejected writing of May of 2009 -- no fair analysis of the evidence and the 
Magistrate's findings could support such an outlandish and meritless claim. Like Treasure 
Valley, Samson worked without a signed written agreement but performed many of the 
duties recited in Miller's May of 2009 written proposal. Like Treasure Valley, Samson 
disputes agreeing to a writing he did not sign. Like Treasure Valley, Samson objected at all 
relevant times to a provision that Miller is now trying to have the Court impose upon him. 
Like Treasure Valley, it was within Miller's power to insist upon execution of the contract 
before Samson began work or at any time thereafter. Having failed to do so, Miller is now 
prevented from gaining judicial enforcement of the contractual terms that she requested 
but did not secure. 
Additionally, equitable estoppel cannot help Miller in her attempt to take undue 
advantage of Samson, because she has neither appealed for, nor has the first element of 
equitable estoppel been shown, to wit: Conduct on the part of Samson which amounts to a 
false representation or concealment of material facts, or, at least, which was calculated to 
convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which 
the party subsequently attempts to assert. See Treasure Valley at 490. Samson testified 
that he told Miller that he "had to have money" not personalty. TR 183 II 4-9. There has 
been no evidence, clear and convincing, or otherwise presented that showed Samson to 
have made either: (1) a false representation that he did not want to have money; (2) 
concealment that he did not want to have money; or (3) conduct which is calculated to 
Similarly in Treasure Valley, although written contracts were presented to the doctor after she began working for 
the healthcare facility, her performance did not invoke the partial performance doctrine. The doctor worked from 
May of 1995 through February of 1997 without a written contract. Id. at 488. 
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convey the impression he did not want to have money. 
The Magistrate did not abuse his discretion because he correctly perceived the issue 
as discretionary, he acted within the bounds of discretion and applied the correct legal 
standards, he reached the decision through an exercise of reason, and based his findings on 
substantial evidence. Specifically, the Magistrate's finding that there was no express or 
implied contract formed as a result of Miller's May of 2009 written proposal because 
Samson rejected it; therefore, the Magistrate's findings are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. See R 71 & TR 134 ll 20-25 & 135 ll 1-3. Namely, that the contract 
was never signed. Id. & see page 8 of Petitioner's Exhibir 7. Also, that Samson flatly rejected 
the contract directly by telling Ms. Miller that he did not like the way she wrote it up and 
she responded by offering to draft another contract that might be acceptable. See TR 151 ll 
4-11. 
II. DID THE MAGISTRATE COURT ERR BY FINDING A FEBRUARY OF 2009 IMPLIED-IN-
FACT CONTRACT EXISTED BETWEEN THE PARTIES? 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized three types of contractual relationships: 
First is the express contract wherein the parties expressly agree regarding a transaction. 
Fox v. Mountain West Electric, 137 Idaho 703, 707-708 (2002) (internal citations omitted). 
Secondly, there is the implied-in-fact contract wherein there is no express agreement but 
the conduct of the parties implies an agreement from which an obligation in contract exists. 
Id. The third category is called an implied- in-law contract, or quasi contract. Id. However, 
a contract implied in law is not a contract at all, but an obligation imposed by law for the 
purpose of bringing about justice and equity without reference to the intent or the 
agreement of the parties and, in some cases, in spite of an agreement between the parties. 
Id. It is a non-contractual obligation that is to be treated procedurally as if it were a 
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contract, and is often referred to as quasi contract, unjust enrichment, implied in law 
contract or restitution. Id. 
An implied-in-fact contract is defined as one where the terms and existence of the 
contract are manifested by the conduct of the parties with the request of one party and the 
performance by the other often being inferred from the circumstances attending the 
performance. Id. The implied-in-fact contract is grounded in the parties' agreement and 
tacit understanding. Id. The general rule is that where the conduct of the parties allows the 
dual inferences that one performed at the other's request and that the requesting party 
promised payment, then the court may find a contract implied-in -fact. Id. 
Fox cites Clements. The Clements case involved an attorney (Clements) against his 
former client (Jungert) for the reasonable value of attorney fees and expenses. Id. at 147. 
Clements represented Jungert in a case where Jungert was judged to have committed the 
tortious act of firing a rifle into the tires of a truck belonging to the Mendenhalls. Id. at 14 7 
and 149. The Jungerrs were dissatisfied with the outcorne of the case and opted to not pay 
Clement's his attorney fees, stating that "as far as I am concerned, you handled this matter 
as the attorney for the insurance company." Clements at 149. Essentially, the trial court 
found that even though no express contract was made between Clements and Jungert, that 
Jungert was sufficiently put on notice that the insurance company was not going to pay for 
Jungert's defense. Thus, Clements was awarded his fees. Clements at 150. The trial court's 
judgment was affirmed. There was no discussion on whether or not Clements attorney 
rates had been disclosed prior to Clements services being terminated. See Clements at 149. 
Jungert appealed and relied upon Felton. The Supreme Court distinguished 
Clements from Felton, in that in Felton, the client did not request the services, but rather had 
refused the attorney's services whereas in Clements, the services had been requested. 
Clements at 153. 
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Here, in comparison to Clements, and Felton, and with respect to the February of 
2009 implied contract, Miller requested Samson's services, and she promised to pay him, 
and Samson performed said services. See Petitioner's Exhibit 1 showing that Miller had 
requested and obtained Samson's services as of 2/13/2009. See Petitioner's Exhibit 6 
showing Miller on 3/7/2009 thanking Samson for helping the estate and taking care of the 
animals; acknowledging the inventory was a huge task; and indicating that Miller had 
enclosed a check to Samson for his "labor." All of these documents were admitted as having 
been written by Miller to Samson. See TR 170 II 20 through 172 II 4. 
Also Samson testified that Miller approached him at the hospital when Mr. Manes 
was on his deathbed. 
Clark: How do you know Jessie Miller? 
Samson: I've met her a few times when she's come up. Over a 
period of all these years I've met her maybe twice at Almon's 
house and maybe once in the Clearwater Baptist Church. And I 
never met her again or seen her again until in the hospital when 
Almon was in the hospital. 
Clark: Okay. Can you tell me about the conversations you had with 
Ms. Miller at the hospital. 
Samson: Well, before Almon passed away she was trying to get 
me to help her, and I didn't want no part of it. And I told her I 
didn't want no part of it. And she kept hounding me and hounding 
me, and on the third or fourth day she said I really need your help 
because I can't trust anybody. And I said, okay. She said, I will be 
well compensated. She kept telling me I would be well 
compensated over this period of four days in the hospital. 
TR 128 ll 5-22. 
Clark: Did she ever tell you how much how she was going to 
compensate you? 
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Samson: Well, they -- after he passed away, it must have been 
about a month, her and Randy came out. They came out I don't 
know how many times. But they said they wanted to get me a cell 
phone, and they were going to put me on the payroll. They 
wanted to get me some health insurance because they got to 
insure the property. And I'm just -- it was just amazing what I was 
hearing. 
Clark: Did you get any of those? 
Samson: Nope. 
TR 176 ll 15 through 177 ll 1 (emphasis added). 
Clark: Mr. Mitchell spent some time trying to get or trying to get 
at whether you were forced or you volunteered or voluntarily went 
out to the Almon Manes' Estate. So my question is: Did you ever 
come to the decision that you were going to work on the Almon 
Manes' Estate without compensation? Was it your intent that you 
would go out there and not get compensated? 
Samson: No. My intent was to be well compensated. 
TR 189 II 6-13. 
The Magistrate did not abuse his discretion because he correctly perceived the issue 
as discretionary, he acted within the bounds of discretion and applied the correct legal 
standards, and reached the decision through an exercise of reason, and based his findings 
on substantial evidence. Specifically, here there is substantial and competent evidence, by 
Miller's own hand and words, that Mr. Samson was working for the estate at Miller's 
request, Miller offered to pay Samson, and Samson performed the work requested. See TR 
135 ll 23 through 149 ll 14 for the core of Samson's testimony about the work he 
performed. However, because the parties never agreed to a specific rate of pay, no express 
contract was formed and no remedy at law could be had. See TR 182 II 22-24. Since, the 
Magistrate had concluded that there was no express contract formed, the equitable remedy 
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of an implied-in-fact contract could be resorted to by the Magistrate. 
THE MEETING OF THE MINDS ISSUE 
Formation of a valid contract requires that there be a meeting of the minds as 
evidenced by a manifestation of a mutual intent to contract. Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 
636,645 (2011). An implied-in-fact contract is grounded in the parties' agreement and 
tacit understanding that there is a contract. Gray at 387. The general rule is that where the 
conduct of the parties allows the dual inferences that one performed at the other's requests 
and the requesting party promised payment, the court may find a contract implied-in-fact. 
Id. 
Miller continues to argue that the Magistrate and the District Court Judge found 
there was no meeting of the minds as to the method or specific rate of compensation on 
which to form an express contract, that there was no meeting of the minds upon which to 
form an implied-in-fact contract. See Appellant's Brief at 6. This is not the correct legal 
standard, the correct legal standard is that a meeting of the minds is evidenced by the 
objective manifestation of a mutual intent to contract. Moreover, Miller's argument is 
nonsensical because if there is a complete and total meeting of the minds that does not 
implicate the statute of frauds, it would always result in an express contract. Clearly, Idaho 
Law allows the formation of an implied contract on a meeting of the minds where there is 
the objective intent to contract. See Clements. 
Here, the Magistrate found that in February of 2009: 
Mr. Samson and Ms. Miller had in implied-in-fact contract ground 
on the parties' agreement and tacit understanding that there was 
a contract. The parties conduct, as previously set forth herein, 
allows for the dual inference that Mr. Samson provided work for 
the estate at Ms. Miiler's request and that Ms. Miller promised 
payment to Mr. Samson for his work. 
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R 75. Said finding, impliedly finds and incorporates therein an objective mutual intent to 
contract in February of 2009. Therefore, the Magistrate did not abuse his discretion 
because he correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, he acted within the bounds of 
discretion and applied the correct legal standards, reached the decision through an exercise 
of reason, and he based his findings on substantial evidence. 
SHOULD THE FOREGOING ARGUMENT FAIL,THEN IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
Where the lower court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, the Idaho 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals will affirm the order on the correct theory. See 
Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Mussell, 139 Idaho 28, 33 (2003). In this case, Samson argued 
for unjust enrichment. The Magistrate found that all the elements of an unjust enrichment 
claim had been proved but denied Samson's unjust enrichment claim solely on the basis 
that "the evidence does not establish the value of the benefit the estate received that would 
be unjust for the estate to retain without payment therefor to Mr. Samson." See R 72-74. 
From the bottom of R 72 to the bottom of R 73, the Magistrate, in his findings, 
correctly identified the following rules of law: 
1. A prima facie case for unjust enrichment is: (1) a benefit conferred upon the 
defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) 
acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant 
to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff of the value thereof. Independent 
School Dist. of Boise City v. Harris Family Ltd. Partnership, 150 Idaho 583,590 (2011). 
2. Unjust enrichment, or restitution, is the measure of recovery under a contract 
implied-in-law. Gray at 388. As previously addressed herein, a contract implied-in-law is 
not a contract at all, but is an obligation imposed by law for the purpose of bringing about 
justice and equity without reference to the intent or the agreement of the parties Fox at 
708. It is a non-contractual obligation that is to be treated procedurally as if it were a 
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contract. Id. 
3. The measure of recovery on an unjust enrichment claim is not the actual 
amount of the enrichment, but the amount of enrichment that would be unjust for one 
party to retain without payment therefore. Gray at 388-89. The plaintiff has the burden of 
proving the defendant received a benefit and the amount of the benefit the defendant 
unjustly retained. Gray at 389. The value of services rendered can be used as evidence of 
the value of the benefit bestowed under the theory of unjust enrichment. Id. However, the 
measure of damages is not necessarily the value of the money, labor and materials provided 
by the plaintiff to the defendant, but the amount of benefit the defendant received that 
would be unjust for the defendant to retain. Independent at 589. 
The Magistrate identified the correct legal standard insofar as he went, but he 
overlooked an important commentary regarding the distinction between the quantum 
meruit measure of damages and the unjust enrichment measure of damages. Although 
Idaho law appears to measure recovery under quantum meruit by the fair market value of 
the goods or services received and used by the defendant, while under unjust enrichment 
the focus is on the value of the benefit which it would be unjust for the defendant to retain, 
Idaho has also recognized that generally there is no difference between the two. Interform 
Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270, 1278 (9th Cir. 1978). Further, footnote 4 of said opinion goes 
on to explain: 
A distinction appears in Idaho law between a recovery in quantum 
meruit, where the parties have attempted to contract but the 
contract is void or unenforceable, and a recovery in unjust 
enrichment where there was never any attempt to arrive at a 
contract. Compare Dale's Service Station, Inc. v. Jones, supra at 
1105-06 and Weber v. Eastern Idaho Packing Co., 94 Idaho 694, 
496 P.2d 693, 696 with Hixon v. Allphin, 76 Idaho 327, 281 P.2d 
1042 (1955) and Continental Forest Products, Inc., 95 Idaho 739, 
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518 P.2d 1201, 1205-06 (1974). In both situations, however, the 
recovery granted is not based upon a contract and in both the 
underlying standard for the recovery is the net benefit conferred 
upon the defendant. As suggested in the text, although the 
formula by which such benefits are measured may vary, in most 
commercial contexts the recovery will be identical under either the 
quantum meruit or unjust enrichment line of cases, Continental 
Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co., supra at 1206." 
The Ninth Circuit's insight is informative regarding the language of Idaho's relevant legal 
standard set forth in Gray and many other cases. The language in the measure of unjust 
enrichment damages rules specifically contemplates, allows, and directs that the measure 
of damages in unjust enrichment most often begins with the the value of the money, labor 
and materials provided by the plaintiff to the defendant, even though the amount that 
would be unjust for the defendant to retain might be less. 
Here, Samson proved the reasonable value of services rendered and the Magistrate 
should have considered it as evidence of the amount of the enrichment under the theory of 
unjust enrichment. R 75-77. And although, the measure of damages is not necessarily the 
value of the money, labor and materials provided by the plaintiff to the defendant, it very 
well can be, and in this case it must be because there is no contradictory evidence showing 
Miller was entitled to a different calculation or offset. Miller did not present any evidence, 
or even argument, that contradicted Samson's equitable case -- that it was unjust for Miller 
to retain the fair and reasonable value of his services and the expenses he incurred on 
behalf of the estate. When the Magistrate found Samson proved the reasonable value of his 
services and reasonable value of his expenses, and Miller failed to present evidence that a 
different calculation or offset was appropriate in the case, Samson proved that dollar-for-
dollar Miller was enriched thereby and dollar-for-dollar that it would be unjust for Miller to 
retain her enrichment thereupon. 
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As stated above, it was Samson's burden to prove his measure of damages under the 
unjust enrichment measure (unjust retention). Likewise, it was Samson's burden to prove 
his measure of damages under quantum meruit (reasonable values). In this case, there is 
no difference in the result from the two measures of damages. 
Here, it was found that the reasonable amount of the value of money, services, and 
materials that Samson provided to Mi Iller was $30,296.47 plus pre-judgment interest. R 
81-82. The reasonable value of services rendered equals the amount of the enrichment. It 
follows therefrom, that the amount of the enrichment less any equitable offsets equals the 
amount that would be unjust for Miller to retain. It was not Samson's duty to prove any 
offsets, or alternate calculations, that Miller might be entitled to. 
Therefore, the Magistrate erred because he incorrectly applied the legal standard. 
However, to the penny, the Magistrate reached the correct result on the alternate theory of 
quantum meruit and therefore the Court should affirm the Order Granting Petition for 
Allowance of Claim on the correct theory of unjust enrichment. 
III. DID THE MAGISTRATE COURT ERR IN GRANTING QUANTUM MERUIT RELIEF WHEN 
SAID THEORY WAS NOT ARGUED BY SAMSON? 
Neither the Idaho Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals considers assignments of 
error not supported by argument and authority in the opening brief. See Hogg v. Wolske, 
142 Idaho 549, 559 (2006) ( emphasis added). Here, Miller cites no authority whatsoever 
in support of her assignment of error. See Appellant's Brief at 7-8. Therefore, the issue 
should be dismissed. 
SHOULD THE ABOVE ARGUMENT FAIL, THEN IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
The doctrine of quantum meruit is a remedy for an implied-in-fact contract and 
permits a party to recover the reasonable value of services rendered or material provided 
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on the basis of an implied promise to pay. Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 
378,387 (2009). 
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this code, the principles of law and 
equity supplement Idaho's probate statutes. Idaho Code§ 15-1-103. Equity not only 
permits courts to analyze all the relevant facts, it also permits courts to consider any 
equitable remedy. Climax at 797. Idaho's probate law operates in both law and equity. See 
Idaho Code§ 15-1-103. However, an equitable remedy is not available, if there is a remedy 
in law. Farmers Nat. Bank v. Wickham Pipeline, 114 Idaho 565 (1988). 
Executors who fail to request clarification on a claim waive the right to challenge the 
formal sufficiency of a claim. See Carlson v. Carlson's Estate, 93 Idaho 258 (1969). Further, 
if the claim against an estate for services rendered clearly calls executors' attention to the 
fact of services, the period during which rendered, and amount demanded that is all that is 
sufficient for valid claim. See Nagele v. Miller; 72 Idaho 24 (1951). 
A claim against a decedent's estate need not be in any particular 
form; it is sufficient if it states the character and amount of the 
claim, enables the representative to provide for its payment, and 
serves to bar all other claims by reason of its particularity of 
designation[ ... ] It is universally held that the statement of a claim 
against a decedent's estate need not conform to the technical 
rules of pleading, and the facts need not be set out with the 
particularity of a complaint. 
See Nagele at 27. 
A claim against an estate need not state all the facts with the 
precision and detail required in a complaint, but it is sufficient to 
indicate the nature and amount of the demand in such a manner 
as to permit the executor and the probate judge to act advisedly 
upon it. 
Id. at 27 ( emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
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This court has repeatedly stated that a claim against an estate 
need not be drafted with the precision of a complaint, but rather it 
is sufficient if it indicates the nature and amount of the demand in 
such a manner that the executors and probate court can act 
advisedly on it. The law is well settled that if there is any 
uncertainty in a claim filed against an estate, it is incumbent upon 
the executors to call for clarification. If the executor wishes to rely 
upon a formal defect in the claim, he should make his objection 
upon this ground known to the claimant in time to allow the 
claimant to file an amended claim prior to the expiration of the 
time allowed for filing. The failure of the executor seasonably to 
raise an objection to the form of the claim constitutes a waiver of 
the right to rely upon formal defects in rejecting the claim. This 
does not mean that when suit is brought on the rejected claim the 
claimant is relieved of the obligation of proving the validity of his 
claim. The respondents will have an opportunity at trial to dispute 
the existence of the debt and to call for a clarification of the nature 
of the claimant's demand. 
Carlson v. Estate of Carlson, 93 Idaho 258, 260 (1969) ( emphasis added) (internal citations 
omitted). 
A pleading shall specify the relief sought but it may add as general prayer for such 
further or other relief as may be deemed just and equitable, even without the prayer for a 
specific remedy, proper relief may be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the 
complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. See Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, 185 SCRA 425, 
432-433 (1990). 
Equitable subrogation derives from the equitable power of the courts and it should 
be administered to ensure real and essential justice without regard to form. Because 
sufficient facts were alleged in the complaint to give rise to subrogation, and because those 
facts were established at trial, the district court did not err in finding liability on the theory 
of subrogation. Hoopes v. Hoopes, 124 Idaho 518, 522 (App. 1993). 
If the plaintiffs' prayer for relief seeks not only a declaratory judgment but also 
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general equitable relief, the plaintiffs are entitled to invoke the long arm of equity to receive 
whatever relief the court may from the nature of the case deem proper. Any relief can be 
granted under the general prayer which is consistent with the case stated in the complaint 
and is supported by the proof provided the defendant will not be surprised or prejudiced 
thereby. Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296,308, 309 (1998). 
Here, this is a probate case and Samson stated the character and amount of the claim 
with sufficient particularity to enable the representative to provide for its payment, and to 
bar all other claims by reason of its particularity of designation. That is the personal 
representative knew how much to pay Samson, where to send the money, and that this 
would preclude any other claims for Samson's labor and expenses. See Petitioner's Exhibit 
9A. Further, it is universally held that the statement of a claim against a decedent's estate 
need not conform to the technical rules of pleading. So there was no need for Samson to 
even plead law or equity or formulate a formal prayer for relief. It is true, Samson did not 
specifically plead for quantum meruit relief, but he did state in his Answer to Counterclaim 
that he believed his claim arose in equity. R 27. It is also true that at trial, Samson's 
attorney did not argue for quantum meruit relief but rather argued for relief under unjust 
enrichment. The Hoopes, Eugenio, and Pamela B. courts clearly show that a general prayer 
for equitable relief allows the court to fashion any other equitable relief that fits the 
evidence.2 Miller does not argue that the evidence does not fit the relief granted here, but 
rather argues that Samson failed to argue for the specific relief granted. The law does not 
require Samson to do so. Miller cannot claim that she was prejudiced by Samson's 
attorney's failure to argue for quantum meruit relief, because the relief ordered was driven 
by the pleadings and the evidence in the case, all of which Miller was privy too. As the 
Nagele court stated, the failure of the executor to seasonably to raise an objection to the 
2 Note that Eugenio and Pamela B. cases are persuasive, but not binding authority. Hoopes is binding authority. 
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form of the claim constitutes a waiver of the right to rely upon formal defects in rejecting 
the claim. 
With respect to the Magistrate's finding that quantum meruit was an appropriate 
remedy -- the Magistrate did not abuse his discretion because he correctly perceived the 
issue as discretionary, acted within the bounds of discretion, applied the correct legal 
standards, reached the decision through an exercise of reason, and based his findings on 
substantial evidence. 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
Where the lower court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, the Idaho 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals will affirm the order on the correct theory. See 
Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Mussell, 139 Idaho 28, 33 (2003). In this case, Samson argued 
for unjust enrichment. The Magistrate found that all the elements of an unjust enrichment 
claim had been proved but denied Samson's unjust enrichment claim solely on the basis 
that "the evidence does not establish the value of the benefit the estate received that would 
be unjust for the estate to retain without payment therefor to Mr. Samson." See R 72-74. As 
set forth above, Samson proved the reasonable value of his services and the reasonable 
value of his expenses enriched Miller dollar-for-dollar, and there was no evidence to 
contradict Samson's case that it would be unjust for Miller to retain any portion of said 
benefit, dollar-for-dollar. 
IV. DID THE MAGISTRATE COURT ERR IN AWARDING REASONABLE VALUE OF SERVICES 
AND REASONABLE EXPENSES DAMAGES? 
For a quantum meruit claim the measure of recovery is the reasonable value of the 
services rendered or of goods received, regardless of whether the defendant was enriched. 
See Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430, 434-435 (App. 2002). 
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Miller contends that there was no evidence of the reasonable value of the services. 
This is not true. Samson billed Miller and therein stated that he thought $20 was fair for 
the services he provided. See Petitioner's Exhibit 9A. He also stated therein how many 
hours he worked and the type of work he completed. Id. "Fair" and "reasonable" are 
synonymous here, and the trial court is entitled to make reasonable inferences from the 
evidence. Further, Mr. Samson testified that his bill was a low estimate as to the work he 
did for the Estate and the expenses he incurred. 
Clark: So this bill was on the hours that you spent is an estimate? 
Samson. Yes. 
Clark: Is this a highest estimate or a low estimate? 
Samson: It's a low estimate. 
Clark: Is it your testimony today, then, that you whatever is in that 
bill you believe to have been correct and accurate at the time that 
you presented the bill or prepared the bill? 
Samson: Yeah. 
TR 167 ll 25 through 168 ll 9. 
Samson is not under any burden to present his evidence of his reasonable value of 
his services evidence by specifically invoking a phrase of art such as "$20 per hour was the 
reasonable value of the services I provided." That would be like saying that a murderer who 
confessed on the stand that he thought about it all day prior to beating his victim to death 
was not guilty of premeditated murder on the theory that no witness invoked the magic 
words of "malice aforethought." 
Further, Samson presented the fuel expenses that showed up on Mr. Samson's 
father's credit cards. See Petitioner's Exhibits 17 through 31. The amount of the charges 
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were made by Mr: Samson and the fuel provider are arm's length transactions and are 
evidence of the reasonable value of the goods received. Samson testified that all the 
purchases were used on behalf of the Estate. TR 163 - 165. Under Miller's theory, because 
Samson did not invoke the magic words that fuel bills were "the reasonable value of the 
expenses incurred," that there was no evidence of the same. That is an absurd and 
meritless conclusion. 
Moreover, Samson's statement in his bill that $20 per hour was a fair amount for his 
services was bolstered by many witnesses, who had provided similar services in the local 
area. 
Dewey Bailey, who fed Mr: Manes horses, charged $25 an hour to feed horses. See 
TR 23 11 6-15. This was the same person that Mr. Manes trusted to feed his horses the three 
months preceding his death.3 TR 211114-18. These were the very same horses that 
Samson fed. 
Ed Groseclose said it would take three workers two months to just sort the scrap out 
of the personalty. He testified that laborer's would receive a rate of $10 per hour and a 
supervisor would receive a rate of $15 per hour. TR 3611 7-21 and TR 38115-15. Assuming 
a person works a 40 hour week for 8 weeks that is $11,200 in labor ($400 a week for 
laborer 1 + $400 a week for laborer 2 + $600 a week for a supervisor). That is just to sort 
out the scrap and did not include hauling off garbage, etc. Id. Also keep in mind that Mr. 
Samson, being Almon and Virginia's long time and trusted friend was uniquely qualified to 
identify and set aside keepsakes where others would think it was junk as Steve Kalinoski 
had thought. See Petitioner's Exhibit 3 and 6, TR 128 ll 12-22, TR 27 11 15. 
Zane Cunningham testified that he was paid $4,000 for just cataloging an estate -- a 
3 For his efforts the Millers called Mr. Bailey a worm and instead of paying him an amount they thought to be fair 
they paid him nothing. TR 22 II 2-10. 
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task that took him weeks. TR 11 23. Mr. Samson worked months and he did far more than 
catalog. See Petitioner's Exhibit 9A. He supervised the winding down of an Estate that had 
an enormous amount of personalty. Three airplanes, perhaps 50 cars, all sorts of farm 
implements, batteries, and on and on. It was the Personal Representative that chose not to 
have an Estate sale. She was the one that chose to have Mr. Samson sort through all of this 
and to set aside the "good stuff" and put it into containers. See Petitioner's Exhibit 11 & TR 
90 II 20 through 9111 2. That's precisely what Mr. Samson did and there is no evidence to 
the contrary. 
William Howell testified that as a ranchhand and general laborer he made $8 per 
hour in Idaho county. TR 80 II 13. Idaho county is situated in the state of Idaho and in this 
state minimum wage is $7.25 per hour. 
However, again, the reasonable value of the goods and services Miller received was 
best proved by Samson himself. Given all of the different responsibilities Samson had he 
figured $20 an hour for his labor was fair (see Petitioner's Exhibit 9A) or in other words, the 
reasonable value of the services rendered. There was no testimony or evidence that 
directly challenges the $20 per hour figure. There was no testimony or evidence that 
challenged Samson's wear and tear on the tires. There was no testimony that the amount 
paid for fuel was unreasonable. Once more, the magistrate found Samson's testimony to be 
credible. 
Mr. Samson testified and presented evidence regarding the 
reasonable value of the services he provided to the estate. Ms. 
Miller did not testify or present any evidence. The court finds Mr. 
Samson's testimony and the evidence he presented on the issue 
credible, and there being no contradicting evidence presented by 
Ms. Miller, accepts Mr. Samson's testimony and evidence regarding 
the reasonable value of services he provided as fact. 
R 76, footnote 3. 
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Miller wrote to Samson agreeing with him that the job was hard and it was a lot of 
responsibility. See Petitioner's Exhibit 6, 12, & 13. Milller had the opportunity to object to 
foundation and cross-examine Samson as to his bill and failed to undermine the bill or his 
testimony relating to it. Similarly, Miller had every opportunity to disprove Samson's 
calculation of what was a fair hourly rate with her own witnesses, but she did not contest --
with any evidence -- that rate was not a reasonable value of the services rendered. Thus, 
the rate of $20 per hour was the established and uncontroverted reasonable value of his 
services. 
Samson worked at least 1193 hours in the service of the Estate. See Petitioner's 
Exhibit 9A & TR 16711 25 through 16811 9. At $20 per hour the value of his labor alone is 
$23,860. Samson purchased $1,586.02 in fuel on behalf of the estate, which is still indebted 
for, and for which he only asked for 80% of the value thereof or rather $1,268.82. See 
Petitioner's Exhibit 9A. Samson purchased tires for his pickup in the amount of $1181 
which he attributed 65% of the wear to service to the Estate for a total of $767. Id. Samson 
even gave the Estate a $1500 offset for the value of the Honda ATV Four-Wheeler that he 
was given, which the Magistrate awarded Miller an optional credit for. Id. & R 81-82. 
V. IS SAMSON ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL? 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 the Respondent requests attorney fees and costs 
for opposing the Personal Representative's appeal. Miller essentially continues a frivolous, 
baseless and meritless pursuit of getting the Magistrate's decision overturned. Miller has 
failed to make a serious effort in identifying applicable law and fairly represent the record 
causing Samson to once again take extra effort to unravel the multitude of Miller's baseless 
contentions. 
Miller's first issue is that the trial court erred by finding the parties did not have an 
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express contract based upon performance. See Appellant's Brief at 3. Therein, Miller cites 
only that "Equity does not intervene when an express contract prescribes the right to 
compensation. Vanderford Company, Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547,558 (2007)." Said 
authority in no way sheds light on Miller's issue, and therefore the issue was brought 
without any basis, frivolously, and without merit. 
Miller's second issue is that the trial court erred by finding that an implied-in-fact 
contract existed between the parties. See Appellant's Brief at 5. Miller cites that implied-in-
fact contracts are "dependent on mutual agreement or consent,and on the intention of the 
parties; and a meeting of the minds is required. 17 C.J.S. § 6(b) at 422." Miller had notice of 
binding authority. R 8. Nevertheless, Miller inexplicably cites only persuasive authority in 
regard to what is required in the formation of an implied-in-fact contract. Further, Miller 
cites on page 6 of her brief, that "Quantum meruit is the appropriate recovery under a 
contract implied-in-fact. Barry v. Pac. W Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827,834 (2004)." Again, 
said authority in no way sheds light on Miller's issue, and no additional authority was cited 
for this issue. Therefore, the issue was brought without base, frivolously, and without 
merit. 
Miller's third issue is that the trial court erred in granting quantum meruit relief 
when said theory was not argued by Samson. Miller cites no authority whatsoever in 
support of the issue she raises. Therefore, the issue was brought without any basis, 
frivolously, and without merit. 
Miller's fourth and final issue is that the trial court erred in granting damages when 
no evidence was presented at trial regarding reasonable value of services. See Appellant's 
Brief at 3 & 8. As stated above, Miller's contention that there was no evidence of the 
reasonable value of the services is just plain false. Samson billed Miller and therein stated 
that he thought $20 was fair for the services he provided. See Petitioner's Exhibit 9A. He 
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also stated therein how many hours he worked and the type of work he completed. Id. 
"Fair" and "reasonable" are synonymous here, and the trial court is entitled to make 
reasonable inferences from the evidence. Further, Mr. Samson testified that his bill was a 
low estimate as to the work he did for the Estate and the expenses he incurred. TR 167 ll 
25 through 168 ll 9. Additionally, as stated above, Samson produced many witnesses who 
testified the going rate for similar work from the local area. 
In addition to the foregoing failures to cite relevant and binding legal authorities in 
support of the key issues in her appeal, Miller makes many baseless, frivolous, and 
meritless statements regarding the evidence adduced at trial that are misleading: 
ONE 
Samson provided services for the Estate on his own free will. See 
TR 188 II 22-23. 
Appellant's Brief at 2. This statement is Miller's intentional act to mislead or confuse the 
Court into believing that Samson did not expect compensation in return for the services he 
rendered, which is patently false. Samson testified as follows: 
Clark: Mr. Mitchell spent some time trying to get or trying to get at 
whether you were forced or you volunteered or voluntarily went 
out to the Almon Manes' Estate. So my question is: Did you ever 
come to the decision that you were going to work on the Almon 
Manes' Estate without compensation? Was it your intent that you 
would go out there and not get compensated? 
Samson: No. My intent was to be well compensated. 
Clark: Okay. And you went out there willingly expecting to be 
compensated? 
Samson: Yeah. 
TR 189 ll 6-16. 
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TWO 
At trial, Samson went through and testified about all of the 
obligation in the Agreement that he performed. Samson argued 
that performance could establish, or bind a party, without a 
signature ... Miller respectfully contends that the evidence at trial 
supports a finding that the Agreement and its terms is binding 
based on performance as argued by Samson ... Samson performed 
under the Agreement and argued for its enforceability. The only 
enforceable contract, whether it be express or implied, is the 
Agreement based on performance as argued by Samson. 
Appellant's Brief at 3, 5 & 10 (emphasis added to the factual mistatements). These 
statement are Miller's intentional act to mislead or confuse the Court into believing Samson 
waived or is estopped from pursuing alternate theories of recovery because his attorney 
made an argument in favor of using Miller's May of 2009 written proposal to examine 
Samson. See TR 149 1119 through 150 111-20. Samson's attorney was entitled to speculate 
upon, pursue, and abandon alternate theories of recovery as he deemed to be in his client's 
interest. Samson has long since suspended pursuing the alternate theory that he might be 
entitled to all of the property listed in Miller's May of 2009 written proposal. Miller is 
aware of this but nonetheless makes such baseless, meritless, and frivolous statements. 
THREE 
The evidence in the record is in not in [sic] dispute that Miller told 
Samson that he would not be compensated with money ... While 
Samson testified that he told Miller he wanted money, Miller did 
not agree and told Samson that he would be well compensated ... 
This is a matter where Miller consistenlty stated that monetary 
compensation would not be paid. 
Appellant's Brief at 4, 6 ( emphasis added). While it is not in dispute that Miller attempted to 
get Samson to agree to no monetary compensation on a couple of instances, Miller omits 
that Miller told Samson that he was going to be put on the payroll and issued checks for his 
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labor. TR 176 ll 15 through 177 ll 1 & Petitioner's Exhibits 6 & 12. 
FOUR 
Samson never testified to the Court that he was requesting $20 
[per hour] ... Exhibit 9A was a letter Samson allegedly sent regular 
and certified mail to Miller. There was never any testimony as to 
its contents ... 
Appellant's Brief at 9. Samson presented to Miller a bill for the fair value of his services 
which he calculated to be $20 per hour. See Petitioner's Exhibit 9A. Not only did Samson 
actually send the bill, he testified at length about the contents therein, and further, 
regarding the bill Samson testified that he estimated on the low side to the benefit of the 
estate. TR 157 ll 5 through 168 ll 9. The Magistrate was within his discretion infer 
therefrom that Samson's bill and the statements regarding the fairness of his bill 
represented the reasonable value of his services. Miller's misstatements and omission on 
such key facts reveal the meritless, baseless, and frivolous nature of her appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court's Order on Appeal affirming the Magistrate's Order Granting 
Petition For Allowance of Claim should be affirmed, either "as is" or under the alternate 
theory of unjust enrichment, and the Respondent's request for attorney fees and costs 
should be granted. 
Thomas J. Clark 
Attorney for espondent 
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